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In Search of the Massachusetts - Nova Scotia Dynamic 
George Rawlyk has hit upon the rather novel idea of studying the relations 
between two colonial neighbors, Nova Scotia and Massachusetts,1 whose 
histories, both in colonial times and since, have intersected at a number of 
points. The story is made more interesting by the fact that Nova Scotia was at 
first Acadia, a French outpost and symbol, close at hand, of the dark and 
sinister forces of Catholicism against which New England's Puritans stood 
most firmly opposed. Diplomatic and military encounters between the two 
were inevitable but despite them, the people of Massachusetts were unen-
thusiastic, even hostile, to any notions of expansion. Private interests periodic-
ally stirred Massachusetts into direct interference in Nova Scotian affairs 
since, whether under French governance or English, it was almost completely 
an economic appendage. But generally, Rawlyk tells us, Massachusetts looked 
upon its tiny northern neighbor — with at best one fifteenth of its population 
— as cold and forbidding and its government, by the 1750s and 60s, as un-
attractively Anglophile, commercial, military, and elitist. Massachusetts, 
it would seem, struck upon the "open door policy" 150 years early. 
For the most part, Rawlyk's is a study of military events strung together 
by a loose thread of interpretation that stresses rather vaguely discerned 
Massachusetts attitudes and concerns about its northern neighbor. Thus in 
place of John Bartlet Brebner's thesis that the events of the 1750s and 60s — 
the expulsion of the Acadians and the influx of New England settlers into 
Nova Scotia — were the logical culmination of the numerous Massachusetts 
military thrusts northward,2 Rawlyk leaves us with the fragments: genuine 
fears about French invasion at times, narrow dreams of British imperialism 
at others, but certainly no long-range, coherent policy. In fact, almost over-
modestly, Rawlyk creates the impression that his story is rather unimportant, 
that Massachusetts' relations with Nova Scotia were of little consequence 
compared with the grand roles Massachusetts played in the American Revolu-
tion or in the great American imperial thrust, first into Canada and then into 
the American West. Nova Scotia, so it seems, fell outside the mainstream of 
Massachusetts history. Is this the best we can do in uncovering the Massa-
chusetts-Nova Scotia dynamic? 
Material suggesting the need for a revision of eighteenth-century Massa-
chusetts-Nova Scotian history has been accumulating since the 1960s. A 
number of mutually reinforcing local studies undertaken by Kenneth Lock-
ridge, J. M. Bumsted, Edward M. Cook, Jr., Philip Greven, David Grayson 
Allen, and others have shown that long established farming communities, for 
1 George A. Rawlyk, Nova Scotia's Massachusetts: A Study of Massachusetts-Nova Scotia 
Relations, 1630 to 1784 (Montreal and London, McGill-Queen's University Press, 1973). 
2 John Bartlet Brebner, The Neutral Yankees of Nova Scotia (New York, 1937). 
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the most part in the eastern part of Massachusetts, but also elsewhere in New 
England, were undergoing a crisis by the second quarter of the century.3 Land 
had been subdivided by successive generations of farmers until the point had 
finally been reached when farming units were verging on subsistence-level, 
land values were being forced beyond the means of most men, and thus 
almost an entire generation found itself searching for a place in a suddenly 
topsy-turvy world. For some, the answer was simple: migration to new com-
munities on the frontier. But as Kenneth Lockridge has pointed out, most 
young men seemed reluctant to leave their hometowns: the pull of the ex-
tended family was as strong as it had ever been in a Puritan society.4 Some 
therefore became farm laborers and others artisans, thereby contributing to 
an economic diversification and a growing commercialization of their towns. 
Some, as J. M. Bumsted suggests, turned to religion as the Greak Awakening 
burned its way over New England in the 1740s.5 Others, of course, simply 
became drifters, posing a constant threat to the traditional New England 
social order and testing the ability of local authorities to maintain the highly 
valued harmony and peace of their communities. Even towns where land de-
pletion was not extensive, such as in Worcester County, found themselves 
"warning out" more than four times as many indigents in the period from 
1754 to 1767 than they had in the previous 17 years.6 
What to do with a footloose generation? The problem is not an unfamiliar 
one in our own time, with its student loans, government-sponsored youth 
hostels, and its Opportunities for Youth. In colonial times the answer was 
different, but surely it is no accident that the crisis in the farming areas was 
closely paralleled by a marked increase in Massachusetts' involvement in 
imperial military adventures, beginning with Carthegena in 1740, then Louis-
bourg in 1745, Kennebec in 1754, Chignecto, Virginia, Crown Point, Ticon-
deroga, Louisbourg, Quebec, and Montreal. Massachusetts, of course, did 
not begin the wars with France that account for so many military opportuni-
3 Kenneth Lockridge, "Land, Population, and the Evolution of New England Society, 1630-
1790," Past and Present, no. 39 (April, 1968), pp. 62-80; Kenneth Lockridge, A New England 
Town, the First Hundred Years: Dedham, Massachusetts, 1636-1736 (New York, 1970); J. 
M. Bumsted, "Religion, Finance, and Democracy in Massachusetts: The Town of Norton 
as a Case Study," Journal of American History, 57 (1970-71), pp. 817-31; Edward M. Cook, 
Jr., "Social Behavior and Changing Values in Dedham, Massachusetts, 1700 to 1775," 
William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd. ser., 27 (1970), pp. 546-80; Philip J. Greven, Jr., Four 
Generations: Population, Land, and Family in Colonial Andover, Massachusetts (Ithaca, 
1970); David Grayson Allen, "The Zuckerman Thesis and the Process of Legal Rationaliza-
tion in Provincial Massachusetts," William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd. ser., 29 (1972), pp. 
443-60. See also Richard L. Bushman, From Puritan to Yankee: Character and the Social 
Order in Connecticut, 1690-1765 (Cambridge, Mass., 1967). 
4 Lockridge, "Land, Population, and Society," pp. 73, 74. 
5 Bumsted, "Religion, Finance, and Democracy," p. 828. 
6 Allen, "Zuckerman Thesis," p. 454. 
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ties. But she did manage to organize expeditions well before either of the 
major wars broke out, and in comparison with the military contributions of 
other colonies, she was a leader. 
There is no simple explanation for Massachusetts' imperial escapades: a 
safety valve theory is only a partial answer and certainly the desire for patron-
age in supply contracts, and preferment and status for the officer class (all 
carefully choreographed by the patronage-conscious, master-imperialist 
William Shirley) played a role. But whatever the mix of explanations, one is 
forced to conclude that internal considerations seemed every bit as com-
pelling as the threat of French invasion. Take the Kennebec expedition, for 
example. Here was a trek of 500 young men through a sparsely settled area of 
Maine that turned up not a trace of the supposed French invaders. Was the 
French threat the reason for this escapade, or was it initiated by Shirley and 
the Kennebec Proprietors as essentially a real estate promotion: show the 
young, land-hungry, would-be farmers the land and then let nature take 
its course? 
Fortunately we know something about the men who made up the major 
expeditions into Nova Scotia. There are fairly complete lists of the partici-
pants in both the Louisbourg expedition of 1745 and the Beausejour expedi-
tion of 1755.7 The latter list is the more valuable since it includes not only 
names but also age, place of birth, place of last residence, and occupation. 
Confirming the safety valve theory, analysis shows that the volunteers were 
young, more than 75 per cent of them were laborers or artisans rather than 
farmers, and the vast majority of them came from established farming com-
munities, particularly in Essex, Middlesex, and Bristol counties. The per-
centage of volunteers from the large coastal towns such as Boston, from the 
fishing counties such as Barnstable, and from frontier areas — western 
Hampshire and the Maine counties — was low suggesting that recruitment 
was very much a function of the agricultural recession.8 Interestingly, recruit-
7 "Louisbourg Soldiers," New England Historical and Genealogical Register, 24 (Boston, 
1870), pp. 367-80; 25 (1871), pp. 249-69; [John Winslow's] "Journal and Correspondence 
During the Expeditions to Nova Scotia and Crown Point," 10 February 1755 to 23 April 
1757, pp. 20-64, an unpublished manuscript in the Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston. 
8 My analysis differs somewhat from Rawlyk's which appears on pp. 208-9 of his book. He 
concludes that "the regional response does not fall quickly into any discernible pattern" (p. 
209). But, through mathematical error, he greatly underestimates the percentage of volun-
teers from Middlesex County, the population of which was less than that of Essex County. If 
he is correct that there were 411 volunteers from Middlesex, the ratio of volunteers to total 
male population over sixteen years of age is 5 per cent. My own estimate, however, places 
the percentage of volunteers in Middlesex at between 3 and 4 per cent, still high compared 
with Suffolk (including Boston), York, and Barnstable. Rawlyk also incorrectly locates the 
list of volunteers in the Massachusetts Archives rather than the Massachusetts Historical 
Society. 
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ment seems also to have been a function of the political role of the towns 
although here it is difficult to tell which is cause and which effect. There were 
nearly 28 per cent more recruits from towns that formed the political opposi-
tion in the Massachusetts General Court from 1755 to 1765 as compared with 
the towns that formed the governor's friends or Court Party.9 Since political 
opposition sprang in part from agricultural recession, at first it would seem 
we are dealing only in common causes. But also to be considered is the educa-
tive impact of the Nova Scotian experience on the young and impressionable 
minds of the amateur soldiers from Massachusetts. The experience of the 
First World War entirely transformed the values of a generation of Europeans. 
What did Louisbourg and Beausejour do to the thinking of New Englanders? 
There was bitterness and anger, for one thing, when the British took the 
credit for the victories and gave scant credit to the real victors, the New 
Englanders. There were clashes, too, between colonial forces and British 
officers that left permanent scars. On the other hand, there was the over-
whelming pride of accomplishment: New Englanders had not only played a 
part in events of world importance, but they had beaten the French, re-
nowned for their military prowess. And this was the generation that was to 
put Massachusetts in the forefront of Revolution by the 1760s. It makes more 
than a little sense, therefore, to see Massachusetts' Nova Scotian experience 
as an essential link in the development of a revolutionary mentality. We know 
that the main thrust of revolutionary sentiment and activity sprang from 
Boston strongly backed by many of the agricultural towns caught in the land 
crisis.10 From a generally introverted, parochial, self-consciousness in the 
early eighteenth century, the people of these towns developed a larger vision 
of themselves and their country. They came to see themselves as fitting actors 
on the world stage and as capable of taking on a world power in combat. Is 
that what the Nova Scotian experience had done for them? 
That certainly was the impression given by James Otis, the popular leader 
and propagandist, who in 1765 reminded his countrymen that in the late war 
"men from time to time were cheerfully raised, and monies granted by the 
provincial representatives of the people, who in reflecting on the honour and 
happiness of being enabled to serve their King & country in this way, had also 
the pleasure of contemplating their own importance in society."11 Otis's 
9 The correlation of towns from which volunteers came with the legislative voting record of 
those same towns is based upon Stephen E. Patterson, Political Parties in Revolutionary 
Massachusetts (Madison, Wis., 1973), Appendix A, pp. 258-65. 
10 Ibid., pp. 45-48, 55-62. 
11 James Otis, Brief Remarks on the Defence of the Halifax Libel on the British-American 
Colonies (Boston, 1765), p. 9. Otis also wrote A Vindication of the British Colonies, Against 
the Aspersions of the Halifax Gentlemen, in His Letter to a Rhode-Island Friend (Boston, 
1765), both of which were answers to a skillful pamphlet by a Tory member of the Newport 
Junto, Martin Howard, Jr., A Letter from a Gentleman at Halifax to His Friend in Rhode-
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remarks remind us that whatever the colonists' view of the British empire 
was to become, they were still convinced in the 1760s of the general benignity 
of the old imperial system. In fact, in their debate with Great Britain, the 
colonists showed that they accepted the mercantilist theory of empire, know-
ing full well that in practice, it provided protection and profits for colonial 
entrepreneurs so long as they were quick to seize the opportunities that pre-
sented themselves. This is the sense in which Massachusetts was "imperialis-
tic" in the provincial period. If expansion was a goal, it was British imperial ex-
pansion, and at no time did Massachusetts leaders argue for removal of the 
French from Acadia in any other terms. It is simply an anachronism to debate 
the issue as to whether Massachusetts was imperialistic or "isolationist" on 
its own behalf, as if Massachusetts were itself an independent country with 
territorial ambitions. Discussions of Massachusetts' military adventures in 
Nova Scotia on these terms carry us little towards an understanding of the 
Massachusetts-Nova Scotia dynamic. 
One suspects, however, that a good, detailed discussion of the economic 
ties between the two colonies would bear fruit. Unfortunately no historian has 
so far told the story of Massachusetts' trade with the French, their virtual 
supply of Fortress Louisbourg, or of Thomas Hancock's and Charles Apthorps' 
supply of the British military at Annapolis and Halifax and of their possible 
relation with the development of Massachusetts policy towards Nova Scotia 
during the Seven Years' War. Nor has anyone adequately explained the com-
mercial network that developed between Boston and Halifax under the aegis 
of New England (chiefly Boston) merchants in Halifax such as Benjamin and 
Joseph Gerrish, Malachy Salter, Joseph Gray, and John Fillis. These were the 
men who were responsible for the pressure that led to the creation of Nova 
Scotia's assembly, and it was also they who successfully asserted the assem-
bly's control over the Lieutenant Governor, Jonathan Belcher, in the early 
1760s.12 To what extent were their political actions reflections of their busi-
Island (Newport, R.I., 1765). In Brief Remarks, Otis does everything but identify Howard 
by name, making it clear that it is a Rhode Islander and not a Haligonian with whom he is 
contending. While Otis continues to refer to his adversary as the "Halifax gentleman", and 
even the "Halifax Tartar", it is clear that his invective is directed at Howard, not, as Rawlyk 
would have us believe (p. 229), at Halifax. It is impossible to see in either of Otis's pamphlets 
the least reflection on Nova Scotia or on Halifax without a gross distortion of Otis's intent. 
Rawlyk, who quotes from Otis's Brief Remarks, incorrectly refers us to Otis's A Vindication, 
(p. 279, fn. 44). 
12 Especially informative of Boston trade with Nova Scotia is W. T. Baxter, The House of 
Hancock: Business in Boston, 1724-1775 (New York, 1965 ed.), pp. 96-110. The role of the 
New England merchants in early Nova Scotian politics is covered by W. S. MacNutt, "The 
Beginnings of Nova Scotia Politics, 1758-1766," Canadian Historical Review, 16 (1935), 
pp. 41-53; Brebner, The Neutral Yankees of Nova Scotia, pp. 18-22, 66-89; and the old but 
useful Duncan Campbell, Nova Scotia in its Historical, Mercantile and Industrial Relations 
(Montreal, 1873), pp. 133-40. 
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ness connections with Massachusetts or, more subtly, of their sense of how 
the various parts of the empire should function? Certainly, the massive influx 
of New England settlers that followed the expulsion of the Acadians directly 
benefited them and their Massachusetts partners. It was the enterprise of 
these Halifax and Boston merchants — partners and often blood relations — 
that reveal what the concept of empire meant in the eighteenth century from 
the colonial point of view, and how the British imperial system worked. 
George Rawlyk approaches some of these problems, but he seldom tackles 
them. At best his book is a recitation of those events, chiefly military, which 
dotted the history of the relations between Massachusetts and Nova Scotia for 
a century and a half. The detail occasionally becomes rich and interesting, 
as it does in his discussion of Louisbourg as a symbol of New England's pur-
pose, and again of Paul Mascarene, the even-handed administrator at Anna-
polis Royal, although in both cases Rawlyk was heavily reliant on the work of 
former students. But where the book is about Nova Scotia, Rawlyk pretty 
much leaves Brebner in command of the field, and where it is about Massa-
chusetts, Rawlyk ignores recent literature and fails to seize the opportunities 
for interpretation that present themselves. There is more to the Massachu-
setts-Nova Scotia dynamic than he tells us. 
STEPHEN E. PATTERSON 
Canadian Painting: Regional or National History? 
The traditional test of the petty regional mind is how it responds to a 
national publication. The scenario is simple as it is common. The publication 
is received in the mail (late), and an immediate check made of the authors 
to see which old class-mate has taken unfair advantage of his proximity to the 
publisher to flog yet another modest article. That done, then it is on to the 
team check: a cumulative assessment of how our side made out and, finally, 
the formulation of a series of complaints on how misunderstood we are by 
the agents of centralism. I have just gone through a form of this exercise 
with some recent national publications in the field of art history. Persons of 
sense have long argued that a full knowledge of a country can only be ob-
tained when the investigator is thoroughly knowledgeable in all the regional 
characteristics that together make up the whole. In the case of Canada surely 
no one believes any longer that the soul of the country was forged on and 
limited by the Laurentian Shield. That said, the question is how did the 
Atlantic provinces fare in the publications under review — fare in the sense 
of how well understood and how accurately assessed in terms of accomplish-
ment and national importance? The answer is that the Atlantic provinces fare 
as well as the whole publication, and the reason is the presence or absence of 
sound scholarship. 
